Authoritarian danger still roaming the country

Although in crisis, Bolsonarism is strengthened by its "digital party," assesses Marcos Nobre.

According to Marcos Nobre, a Philosophy professor at Unicamp and director of the Brazilian Center for Analysis and Planning (Cebrap), Brazil is not polarized, but divided between sectors that don't even agree on what constitutes a fact. "What we have is a division between two completely different and incompatible worldviews. It's different from a democratic dispute where, within the same field, there's a magnetic pole at each point," he summarizes.

This division is likely to reappear in the slates formed for the 2026 presidential campaign and in the election results. "To imagine, for example, a centrist candidacy, the so-called third way, makes no sense, because even those who present themselves in those terms in the election will already be signaling which side they will be on in the second round," he indicates.

In an interview with the Unicamp Journal, the professor analyzes political events of 2025 and reflects on the future of the progressive field and Bolsonarism, which, despite being in crisis, has one advantage: its digital party, which is not accountable and is "completely opaque" in its forms of operation and financing. "Therefore, it is very important not to underestimate Bolsonarism and the authoritarian risk that Brazil faces," he warns.

For Nobre, the trial and conviction of former president Jair Bolsonaro and his allies is a victory for democracy, reinforced by the historic accountability of the military for its crimes, something that has never happened before. With Bolsonaro unable to run in 2026, he assesses, there is an internal dispute within Bolsonarism and the "fearless right" [his term for a segment of the right that allies with the far right without fear of what might happen to democracy] to define its ticket for the election. "What shouldn't be done is to confuse this dispute with a weakening of Bolsonarism," he warns.

The professor also analyzes Donald Trump's attempt to interfere in Bolsonaro's trial, outlining the rapprochement between the US president and the former Brazilian president starting in 2019. "Trump was very important in legitimizing the Bolsonaro government, in the sense of saying: this government is a normal government. The Trump administration normalized the Bolsonaro government. More than that: he was a source of inspiration."

The similarities between the far right in both countries were expressed, for example, in the repeated attacks on democratic institutions. However, Nobre points out that while Brazilian institutions held Bolsonaro accountable for various crimes, such as attempted coups, there was no corresponding action in the United States regarding Trump's actions. "So you see that Brazil, for the first time, really went to the forefront." Check out the analysis:

Unicamp Newspaper – What is your assessment of the conviction of Bolsonaro and his allies, and what are the likely repercussions for the 2026 election?

Marcos Nobre Periods of instability, especially institutional instability, also bring opportunities, both for the worst and for the best. We were unable [in the past] to hold agents of the military dictatorship accountable for their crimes, but in democracy we were able to hold accountable those who attempted a coup d'état. This is unprecedented in the country's history, and it is extremely important. At the same time, there was a mutiny by deputies preventing democratic institutions from functioning, which shows that instability also brings with it significant authoritarian risks.

It is important to emphasize, within the context of this judgment, that I align myself with those who are very clear that the two articles – violent abolition of the rule of law and coup d'état – are completely different concepts from a legal standpoint. One punishes the attempt at a self-coup, and the other punishes a coup d'état. One thing is a crime when one is in power and tries to remain in power. The other is when one is out of power and violently attempts to seize it. The movement to try to merge these two crimes into one is worrying.

What happens to the far right now? From the moment Bolsonaro is convicted, which was completely predictable, he cannot be a candidate, but he is not entirely out of the electoral game. He was declared ineligible in 2023, but he always maintained the idea that he would be able to reverse it. Now it is very clear that this is lost, triggering a dispute within Bolsonarism over who will get that space. People look and say, "They are killing each other." The same thing would happen if Lula said, "I will not be a candidate." There would be a huge dispute.

But we shouldn't confuse this dispute with a weakening of Bolsonarism. That's my biggest concern, because we've already underestimated this alliance between what I call the fearless right – because it's not afraid of losing democracy, it's not afraid of losing everything we've built in the last 40 years – and the far right. This alliance is very strong and has a lot of electoral and social resonance.

There's a fantasy that Lula is unbeatable, that the 2026 election is already won. On the other hand, with the idea that Bolsonarism is in crisis and dying out, there arises, for example, the fantasy that a centrist candidate will emerge. In polls, people say they don't want to vote for either of the two poles, but the center has no corresponding party or electoral support. So it's a fantasy to imagine that this amorphous center will become something.

JU – You point out that there is a division in Brazil, not a polarization. What does that mean?

Marcos Nobre – What we have in Brazil is not polarization, what we have is a division between two completely different and incompatible worldviews. It's different from a democratic contest where, on the same field, there's a magnetic pole at each point. We have a division, and we have to think in terms of that division. Candidates will be chosen based on it. To imagine that there is, for example, a centrist candidacy, the so-called third way, doesn't make sense. Because even the people who present themselves in those terms in the election will already be signaling which side they're on in the second round.

JU – What is the direction this dispute between Bolsonaro's supporters and the progressive camp is heading?

Marcos Nobre – It's a moment of crisis for Bolsonarism, but, as I heard Professor Isabela Kalil say in a seminar at Cebrap: 'Bolsonarism thrives on crisis'. So we have to consider that the political field is structured this way, not only in Brazil, but throughout the world. The Bolsonarist camp has a gigantic competitive advantage over the progressive camp. To clarify what I understand by progressivism: it's not the left. Progressivism is an alliance between sectors of the left and sectors of the democratic right that don't want to ally with the far right.

The progressive field has a party at its center, which is the PT [Workers' Party], a party with deep roots, a mass party, which was successfully built over decades. But it is a traditional party. And Bolsonarism has a digital party. It is not an institutionalized party, registered with the TSE [Superior Electoral Court]. This analysis is part of our research at the Center for Critical Imagination of Cebrap. And the digital party has no entry requirements: you don't need to become a member to be part of it.

From 2022 onwards, there is an alliance between the digital party and the traditional party, or between the traditional parties, because there is a preferential alliance with the PL [Liberal Party], but it is not restricted to it, bringing a huge competitive advantage, because the traditional party has the resources of the electoral fund and the party fund. The digital party, on the other hand, is completely opaque. We don't know how it is financed, how it operates, etc. Therefore, not underestimating Bolsonarism and the authoritarian risk that Brazil faces is very important.

JU – In 2025, there was an attempt by the United States to interfere during Bolsonaro's trial. What is your assessment of Trump's support for the former president?

Marcos Nobre – It was very important for the consolidation of Bolsonarism that Trump was the president of the United States between 2017 and 2021, because we are not an island, and the world is divided between the alliance of the fearless right with the far right and the progressive camp. Trump was very important in legitimizing the Bolsonaro government, in the sense of saying: this government is a normal government. The Trump government normalized the Bolsonaro government. More than that: he was a source of inspiration.

We only need to consider what the first thing Bolsonaro did when he took office was: travel to the United States. He has a famous speech from a dinner in March 2019 in which he says he didn't come to build, but to destroy. So it's very clear that the plan, which is a kind of manual for the current dictator, is: in the first term, destroy the institutions, and in the second term, close the regime.

Bolsonaro didn't get a second term. Trump didn't immediately either, but he did now. So you see that Brazil, for the first time, has truly moved to the forefront, because it was always two years behind the United States. Trump was elected in 2016, Bolsonaro in 2018. The United States has January 6, 2021, we had January 8, 2023. But in April 2023, Bolsonaro was declared ineligible, which is what the United States should have done [with Trump] and didn't. Now they are running a gigantic risk of an unprecedented destruction of democracy in that country. If Trump had been in power when Bolsonaro attempted the coup, we don't really know what might have happened.

JU – And what is your analysis of the rapprochement between Lula and Trump, starting from the moment they meet at the United Nations General Assembly in September?

Marcos Nobre The rapprochement between Trump and Lula has several meanings. First of all, Trump is a entertainerHe knows very well what it means to put on a show, a spectacle. Lula's speech and presence at the UN were spectacular. It will go down in history as Brazil's greatest speech at the UN. In view of this, being a showman, Trump looked and said, 'I'm going to take advantage of this.' And he certainly took advantage of it.

From the moment he said 'there was chemistry, we hugged' (which didn't happen), he made the event about him, not about Lula or Lula's speech. He's a very organized politician. From the moment he does this and receives a favorable reception, he plays the nice guy in front of the cameras, claiming that he's not committed to anyone in principle, only to the interests of the United States, and at the same time, he puts the worst hawk there is to negotiate with Brazil, Marco Rubio, someone against anything that might remotely resemble the left.

Trump is playing a double game because he also realizes that this is a moment of crisis for Bolsonaro's supporters, and that in this moment of crisis it's better to let them sort themselves out, decide what to do, and when they do, he'll go back to supporting them.

So, Trump wins on both sides. Bolsonaro supporters may be upset, but Trump's support will return to them next year. At the same time, he signals that he is open to dialogue [with the Lula government] and puts someone who is an obstacle to negotiation in the spotlight. This kind of double signaling from Trump is very important, this ambivalence of his, because it opens paths for himself. Depending on what happens, he can go one way or the other. He always leaves the path open, without any commitment to coherence in the traditional sense, because precisely what he doesn't want is to have a path blocked. Trump will never be trapped without an escape route for himself.