Turn right

Turn right

Four political scientists analyze the political scenario after the municipal elections, Trump's victory, the attack on the Supreme Court and the revelation of Bolsonaro's coup plan

In November 2024, it was revealed how close Brazil came to a coup d'état after Jair Bolsonaro's defeat in the 2022 elections. The former president and members of his government, including military personnel, were indicted by the Federal Police for crimes such as attempting to violently abolish the democratic rule of law after the plot that included the assassination of the newly elected president and vice president of the Republic, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Geraldo Alckmin, and of the minister of the Supreme Federal Court (STF) Alexandre de Moraes came to light.

Still, the far-right continues to garner significant support, both at home and abroad. In the United States, the victory of Donald Trump, who will return to the presidency after four years for a second term, signals an even more radical shift to the right, given the makeup of his new government, which brings together everyone from anti-vaccine deniers to billionaire Elon Musk, known for his attempts to interfere in the political direction of several countries.

The repercussions of this government in Brazil, as well as the country's political configuration after the municipal elections, which resulted in a strengthening of the right and the so-called “centrão”, are among the topics covered in the interview given by political scientists Armando Boito Jr. (Unicamp), Fernando Limongi (University of São Paulo, USP), Flávia Biroli (University of Brasília, UnB) and Rachel Meneguello (Unicamp).

The professors participated in the seminar celebrating the 50th anniversary of the Postgraduate Program in Political Science at Unicamp, held between November 12 and 14. Precisely during this period, another violent episode related to the extreme right occurred in Praça dos Três Poderes, in the federal capital, when a man linked to the Liberal Party (PL), Bolsonaro's party, tried, on November 13, to attack the STF armed with bombs.

The teachers' assessment is unanimous regarding the urgency of combating extremist actions in the country, as Meneguello highlights: “[…] Keeping all proportions of this comment in mind, the fact is that the country's political situation shows that democracy can no longer do without attention, prevention and combat against the forces of a coup-mongering extreme right present in parties, parliamentarians, corporations and social groups.”

In the following interview, the professors also analyze the most recent municipal elections. For Limongi, although the election strengthened the right wing, which will control around 80% of the country's city halls, there was also a result that could be favorable to the extreme right in the future, since Bolsonaro has put forward names to run for seats in the Federal Senate in 2026. “In each of Brazil's regions, he has a strong candidate for the Senate, which is his main objective: to obtain control of the Senate and then gain some power over the Supreme Federal Court,” he says.

The professors also comment on the international context, in which the Trump administration, in addition to creating difficulties for a global agenda around issues such as climate change and human rights, will also pose challenges in the economic area for Brazil, as assessed by Professor Boito. According to the political scientist, it will be difficult for the country to maintain, together with the group formed by Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS), the process of de-dollarization of the global economy. “Trump has already stated that losing the monopoly of the dollar as an international currency would be the same as losing World War III. He will do everything he can to prevent this process from moving forward,” he states.

Looking to the future, Biroli says, it is necessary for progressive sectors to develop “concrete alternatives to the violence and civilizational regression of the extreme right, as well as to the precarious effects of neoliberalism on life. These alternatives, however, will not prosper if center-left parties and governments understand that their role is to pursue austerity agendas.”

In the polls , the Trump factor and the rise of conservatism in Brazil.

In the polls , the Trump factor and the rise of conservatism in Brazil.

What does Donald Trump's election mean for global geopolitics and what are its repercussions for Brazil?

Armando Boito Jr. – During the Lula 1 and Lula 2 administrations, the international situation was more favorable for the Brazilian state and economy. The government had greater room for maneuver in the international political arena, and the Brazilian economy, capitalist and dependent, was able to deepen, without any significant obstacles, its relations with Chinese state capitalism, which was moving towards becoming the new dynamic pole of the world economy. US imperialism did not significantly oppose the rapprochement between Brazil and China.

Today, the polarization of the United States with China has intensified and this has repercussions on the Latin American periphery. [Joe] Biden [current US president] had already verbalized this in a, let's say, friendly way: “The only thing I don't like about the Lula government is its participation in BRICS”. The future Trump administration will worsen this situation. Trump is as bellicose as Biden, or vice versa, it doesn't matter. However, based on the names chosen by Trump to compose his team and also the reaction of these figures disapproving of the Biden government's decision to promote the escalation of the war in Ukraine – by authorizing the use of US missiles to attack Russian territory – we can hypothesize that Trump will try to get closer to Russia, neutralize it and thus drive a wedge between the governments of Vladimir Putin [Russian president] and Xi Jinping [Chinese president] with the aim of shaking the alliance between Moscow and Beijing and focusing his government's economic and military efforts on the fight against the rising great power that is China.

If this change in foreign policy really happens, the Lula III government will have increasing difficulty in remaining in the BRICS or, at least, in actively participating in this group. The main effort of the BRICS today is to advance the complex and long-lasting process of de-dollarizing the world economy. Trump has already stated that losing the monopoly of the dollar as an international currency would be the same as losing World War III. He will do everything he can to prevent this process from moving forward.

Lula's attempt to resume neo-developmentalism, that is, the policy of state intervention in the economy to accelerate economic growth and reduce poverty, will encounter this obstacle, a pressure towards a clearer alignment with the United States. All the more so because another change that may occur in US foreign policy under the Trump administration will be to tighten the noose around progressive governments in Latin America.

Fernando Limongi – Trump's election is worrying. It's an unexpected result for a politician who, when he first won, we couldn't say what he would do. Today we know very well what Trump is proposing. He has support, he's responding to some desire, however disconcerting that may be. I think there are unfulfilled promises of democracy, and part of these problems can be attributed to neoliberal hegemony, which closed the political agenda. Certain things you can't do. This accelerated economic inequality and increased voter frustration. Trump won many votes among white people without higher education, the big losers of globalization and neoliberalism. So to disregard that there's a message there, I think that's a mistake. Was it Musk? No. It was the people.

There is a problem with contemporary democracy, an old problem: having too much money in campaigns. In the case of the United States, this became astronomical after the deregulation approved by the Supreme Court. But both parties [Democratic Party and Republican Party] have plenty of money. To think that Trump won just because he had the support of Elon Musk or whoever would be a mistake.

Flávia Biroli – I'll begin by addressing what's closest to my current research: the implications for the international human rights system, for multilateral organizations and agreements, and for the equality, diversity, and environmental agendas that have been promoted through these organizations for several decades. In his first term, Trump adopted, in this area, the guidelines that most broadly marked his policies: he provoked or intensified conflicts and divisions, cut funding for human rights policies, and systematically attacked policies promoting gender equality and science. Trump reduced the capacity and called into question the legitimacy of agencies such as UN Women and the World Health Organization [WHO]. This trend is likely to repeat itself. With the worsening climate crisis and the refusal of Trump's inner circle to recognize this crisis as an emergency, the situation is becoming more serious.

This connects to the impact this has on the global far right. There are now established networks that include politicians and businesspeople, among them some from the world of so-called big tech . It's not about succumbing to conspiracy theories, but about taking their networks seriously, the lessons they share, and their likely willingness to operate in the interest of aligned political groups. These networks can also, therefore, reinforce agendas such as attacks on public servants and democratic controls, scientific and climate change denialism, and the normalization of racism and gender violence.

These issues should be considered in conjunction with those that have received the most media attention: Trump's position on armed conflicts, which could mean a reinforcement of Russian positions and Vladimir Putin at this time; his alignment not only with Israel, but with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his far-right coalition; protectionist policies and their effects on disputes with China; and the unpredictability of a vain man who is not very sensitive to anything that does not correspond to his mental universe.

Rachel Meneguello – Trump's campaign and post-victory speeches, announcing a protectionist and xenophobic policy, indicate that the United States will align itself closely with the far-right wave that has been engulfing many countries, especially in Europe. The fact that he chose Senator Marco Rubio as Secretary of State [a position equivalent to Minister of Foreign Affairs], a figure known for his extremist pronouncements, suggests the direction his foreign policy will take. This highlights pressing issues such as his role regarding Israel's actions in Gaza, the impact of his protectionist intentions on the global economy, and his position in the Russia-Ukraine war. However, we do not yet know his concrete actions regarding these points. We will wait.

One of the results of this year's municipal elections was the strengthening of the centrists and the right. The elections also showed an intensification of the dispute between the right-wing parties in Brazil (see the Marçal/Bolsonaro case). What are the directions of the political configuration in the country? What are the prospects for progressive sectors?

Armando Boito Jr. – If the external scenario is difficult and could worsen, the internal scenario is not helping Lula's third government either. Let me explain. Considering what I stated about the international scenario, the reader might recall that Getúlio Vargas took advantage of the division among the central countries to advance Brazilian industrialization. He played with the threat of allying with Germany to pressure the United States. This is generally what happens when those at the top are divided and fighting among themselves: those at the bottom can advance. However, the situation we have today is not the same as in the 1930s. The differences are many, but it suffices to mention the fact that Lula's third government does not have a base in Congress or unity within its own government to play this game. In this year's elections, we saw a strengthening of the right, a very good performance by the far right, and a very weak result for the left and center-left.

I will, however, point out some counterpoints that may eventually allow for a bolder policy on the part of the government. First, we must consider the interests of agribusiness and a large part of the Brazilian bourgeoisie. Brazilian capitalism is highly integrated into trade with China and dependent on it. Other sectors of the Brazilian bourgeoisie aspire to Chinese investments in Brazil. Second, the far right lives with internal divisions. This is not just a conflict of egos or a dispute between cliques without any social ties. This scenario is due to the fact that the far right has a broad and multi-class social base – internationalized financial bourgeoisie, middle capital, farmers, middle class, low-income population and with unstable economic insertion, etc. The disputes between Jair Bolsonaro, Ronaldo Caiado, Tarcísio Freitas, Pablo Marçal and others indicate this heterogeneity. Bolsonaro, in Brazil, and Milei, in Argentina, began their careers with an anti-China rhetoric, but soon had to bow to reality.

There is still the possibility of Lula's third government appealing to popular mobilization, although we know that Lulaism, even in situations where it was seriously threatened – in 2005, during the so-called Mensalão scandal, and in 2015, during the impeachment crisis – did not dare to resort to popular mobilization. In short, there are factors that could eventually allow Lula's third government to gain strength and recover the more progressive economic and social policies implemented in the 2000s. The policies of Lula's third government fall short of those practiced in Lula's first and second governments.

Considering what I have said and warning that we cannot be fatalistic in politics, I would say that we have reasons to be pessimistic. Playing a game similar to Vargas's in the 1930s would open a path full of dangers for a government that, on the domestic front, in addition to not having a reliable base in Congress, finds itself threatened internally by neofascism and military authoritarianism and pressured by the neoliberal democratic camp with which it had to ally itself. We have just seen, with the revelation of the December 2022 coup plan – which included the assassination of Lula, Alckmin and Alexandre de Moraes – that fascists and the military cannot be underestimated. But, as I said, without fatalism: let us combine, as [Antonio] Gramsci advocated, the pessimism of reason with the optimism of will.

Fernando Limongi – I would say that great caution is needed in interpreting the results of the municipal elections and great caution in projecting what this process means nationally. Municipal elections have a different logic when compared to national elections. Except that municipal elections are always very indicative of what is to come in the next election. But I have rarely seen anyone correctly predict the outcome before the general election. So I can't see anything new. Nobody lost radically, nobody won radically.

[Progressive sectors] never do as well [in municipal elections] as they do in national elections. The only exception I remember is 2000, signaling that, in 2002, the left would win. But we only realized that later. After 2002, we said: “Oh, Marta [Suplicy] already won in 2000, in São Paulo.” Similarly, later, we heard: “Oh, [João] Dória won the municipal election in São Paulo, and that means the outsiders are winning.” So there’s always a possibility of connecting what comes after [with what happened before]. But today I would have difficulty making that connection.

Some say that Bolsonaro did not win [the municipal election] and that there were divisions. However, he managed to elect some candidates who could run for the Senate in 2026. In each of Brazil's regions, he has a strong candidate for the Senate. His main objective is to gain control of the Senate and then gain some power over the Supreme Federal Court. I think this is an important result for him.

Flávia Biroli – Today we are experiencing the unfolding of political processes from the last decade, as well as transformations that have occurred in production and technological systems and that have been going on for much longer. In the first case, it is worth remembering that the right wing did not grow like a bolt from the blue: there was a strong campaign that united political sectors, the judiciary, business, agribusiness, and the military against the PT [Workers' Party], circulating narratives that attacked the platforms and actors of the left. In this environment of discredit towards progressive alternatives, the far right grew. Although this is not a homogeneous bloc, the process led to a shift of the entire political system towards the right.

However, it is important to take into account a second aspect: with the changes that have occurred in the production and technology sectors, certain forms of collective organization, such as unions, have lost their reach (with a little help from right-wing politicians who have worked to weaken them through legislative changes); technological advances have changed relationships in different aspects and dimensions of life. There is greater fragmentation and less collective hope. The “every man for himself” and “every man for himself” are the breeding ground in which politicians like Marçal thrive. Today, however, we have the coexistence of different narratives. For progressive sectors, my suggestion is that they listen to and work with black women and young people from the outskirts, peripheral populations seeking alternatives in different parts of the country. Not to adapt to a supposed vision of the times, but to understand the needs and to elaborate them into social justice alternatives that mobilize the collective imagination.

It is up to progressive sectors to offer concrete alternatives to the violence and civilizational regression of the far right, as well as to the effects of the precariousness of life under neoliberalism. These alternatives, however, will not prosper if center-left parties and governments believe that it is their role to adopt austerity agendas that, through exorbitant interest rates and low social investment, direct existing resources into the pockets of those who already have a lot.

Rachel Meneguello – That's true. We've seen an increased presence of center and right-wing parties in mayoral offices and city councils. The five parties that elected the most mayors were the PSD [Social Democratic Party], the MDB [Brazilian Democratic Movement], the PP [Progressives], União Brasil, and the PL, which won 3.614 mayoralties, thus governing 65% of the country's municipalities and 80% of Brazilian voters at the local level. The main left-wing political force, the PT, only won 252 mayoralties, governing 4,9% of the country's voters. It's important to remember that the PT and other center-left and left-wing organizations never had significant local electoral prominence. However, in this election, what we saw was the overcoming of some constants in the party-electoral scenario: the electoral success of the PSD, surpassing the historical hegemony of the PMDB/MDB in the mayoral races (remembering that the MDB still obtained the largest number of councilors among the parties); the victory of center and right-wing parties in 24 capitals – the left only won in Recife (PSB) [Brazilian Socialist Party] and in Fortaleza (PT) – significantly diluting the assertion that the electorates of large centers, notably the capitals, tend to express themselves politically in the progressive field, and breaking the logical reasoning that the presence of a party in the federal Executive tends to positively influence its electoral performance at the local level.

This time, it was not the same with the PT. In fact, in 2012, the last local election with the PT as president of the country, the party won 630 mayoral elections. Now, in 2024, however, the result obtained reflects the impact of six years of a configuration formed along the lines of a right-wing policy with clear populist traits. This is the configuration that has presented difficulties for the governability of the Executive in Congress. Regarding the internal disputes of the right, this is no exception to its behavior, which is already well-known. In the 1990s, Brazil had the most fragmented right-wing parties in Latin America. The rhetoric, styles and representative elites have changed, but the plurality of interests is the same.

From global governance to the failed coup.

From global governance to the failed coup.

Given this global and national political scenario, what can we expect from efforts around current central issues, such as climate change and migration? What should global governance efforts around these issues look like, given that one of the world's leading powers will be led by an anti-immigrant leader who is averse to environmental issues?

Armando Boito Jr. – It is clear that the possibility of making progress in these areas will be greatly reduced. As we know, Trump is a climate change denier and has an anti-immigration stance. Regarding so-called global governance, there are misunderstandings on this matter. Global governance is impossible as long as capitalism and its corollary, imperialism, exist. Governments and progressive forces can and should bring supranational issues, such as the climate emergency and the new wave of migration, to multilateral institutions and forums, but without illusions. Look at the disappointing result of the recent COP29 [29th United Nations Climate Change ^Conference ]. What can be expected from these institutions and forums is to publicize the major problems and also exert some pressure on the most powerful states and reactionary governments. However, the Western imperialist system, led by the United States, does not submit to anything resembling global governance.

The governments of peripheral and dependent countries, especially progressive ones, as well as popular movements in the periphery and the center, must fight against the imperialist system. This is the most urgent task. In the case of Brazil and others, the most efficient way to shake imperialist domination is to strengthen the BRICS and advance measures to de-dollarize the world economy.

Fernando Limongi – This represents a major defeat for these agendas because Trump doesn't embrace these issues. However, the most interesting, and actually surreal, thing about Trump's victory is that the great questioner of neoliberalism came from the right, didn't he? So this is the first major elected official who will truly shake up the neoliberal consensus and change policies, apparently. Unless Trump doesn't deliver on his promises.

And in relation to these issues, there will be a weakening and greater difficulty. We will also see how Europe reacts to this, and whether the right wing also advances in Europe or not. Because we had an unexpected result in France, and in Spain, a result with a certain recovery of the center-left. Germany will hold elections next year. So we need to see if Europe will follow Trump's line or if it will offer a reaction to Trump. I think this is essential for us to know how things will go.

Flávia Biroli – As I answered in the first question, Trump's second term is likely to follow the same direction as his first, undermining multilateral organizations and global governance efforts to address conflicts and the environmental and climate crisis. Trump and his fledgling administration are already the clearest face of what Naomi Klein defined as "tragedy capitalism."

Rachel Meneguello – The global scenario poses serious questions for global governance, and some of these were addressed at this year's G20 meeting [a group that brings together the 19 largest economies in the world and representatives of the European Union and the African Union], albeit unevenly. Brazil managed to prioritize the issue of world hunger and, in some ways, went beyond a simple protocol of intentions, defining concrete developments. However, the consequences that globalization has been imposing on countries for decades, such as the economic crisis with high unemployment rates, large contingents of excluded people, and competition for welfare resources, associated with waves of migration in Europe and America and the incorporation of poor countries into the European Union, have led to an intensification of nationalist discourses, expressed in populist and xenophobic formulas.

Trump’s return to the United States and the victories of the right and far right in the recent elections in Europe point to a strengthening of national borders that are not only economic, but also cultural, ethnic and religious. Agreements between world leaders are unlikely to account for this. The seriousness of the environmental issue may overcome some constraints on this subject, but to some extent the agenda will be held hostage by the impositions made by national issues.

What do the episode of the attack on the STF, carried out by a member of the PL on 13/11, and the military's plan to assassinate Lula, Alckmin and Alexandre de Moraes reveal about the political situation in the country?

Fernando Limongi – The answer is rather obvious: they reveal that things are not going well, that however isolated the action [the attack on the Supreme Court] may have been, it is part of a series of other acts of violence and attacks. Unlike what happened in 2018, those defeated in 2022 did not peacefully accept the election results. The radicalization of the right is evident and worrying.

Flávia Biroli – The far right is becoming more radical. This is not limited to Brazil or isolated episodes. Taken together, these events show the relationship between the radicalization of elite sectors – such as the military – and the base – as in the case of the city council candidate from the PL party who died in an explosion during the attack he planned. At the top, there is a combination of ambitions for undemocratic control of the State, in which retired generals are involved in what has been reported as coup and assassination plots. At the bottom, the echo chambers of the digital world have logics (and overseers) that encourage the separation and dehumanization of those who think differently, undermining the possibility of negotiated political resolutions to conflicts. Underlying this is the resentment of broad sectors of the population towards a democratic regime that poorly responds to their needs.

Rachel Meneguello – These episodes stand out for two reasons. The first is the persistence of terrorist coup-mongering actions after almost two years of an elected democracy with established and functioning democratic powers. It is not clear whether we can call this sequence of actions by extremist militants a regular agenda of violent acts, but it is a fact that the actions to defend and maintain the democratic regime, conducted by the Judiciary during this period, have not been able to contain the audacity of these non-democratic political forces, as shown by the unusual proposal for amnesty for the coup plotters and the proposal for control over the Supreme Federal Court presented to the Legislature.

The second point of note is the concreteness of the evidence collected by the Federal Police regarding the coup agenda and its forms of organization, with the participation of high-ranking military personnel and cadres trained in criminal plans to seize power, indicating with undeniable clarity, in view of the procedures, materials and details, the presence of an organized far right. For me, when I heard the name of the assassination plan – Green and Yellow Dagger –, there was an immediate association with the title of the 1943 report written by a delegate of the Department of Political and Social Order [Dops] of Santa Catarina – “The Nazi Dagger over the Heart of Brazil” –, in which the structure of the Nazi machine and its infiltration tactics in the south of the country are described. Keeping this comment in all proportions, the fact is that the political situation in the country shows that democracy can no longer do without attention, prevention and combat against the forces of a far right-wing coup that is present in parties, parliamentarians, corporations and social groups.