Throughout this series we have discussed different manifestations of the same problem. FirstThe mismatch between a state designed for a reality that no longer exists and a society transformed by profound economic, technological, and social changes. AfterWe analyzed how the near-permanent state of emergency began to shape the actions of governments, pressured by successive crises and a dynamic of continuous response. ThenWe discussed the growing difficulties of social protection in the face of population aging, the transformation of work, the reconfiguration of families, and the expansion of demands that accumulate more rapidly than the institutional capacity to organize them.
We also reflected on the erosion of authority, political and social fragmentation, and the growing difficulty of establishing legitimate priorities in societies marked by unlimited expectations, simultaneous pressures, and low tolerance for choices that imply costs or losses for specific groups. Viewed in isolation, these themes seem to belong to distinct debates. But, seen together, they reveal something deeper: the growing difficulty of political institutions in organizing societies that have become faster, more complex, more connected, and more fragmented than the states themselves can keep up with.
The central problem involves time, coordination, decision-making capacity, legitimacy, and institutional organization. The contemporary state was built to manage relatively more stable societies, with clearer boundaries between economy, politics, and social life, slower rates of transformation, and systems of representation capable of filtering, prioritizing, and mediating conflicts. Many of these conditions have disappeared or lost strength.
The economy is reorganizing itself on a global scale and at an increasing speed. Digital networks dissolve traditional mediations and compress the time frame of politics. Demands emerge instantaneously, simultaneously, and often contradictorily. Health, climate, energy, fiscal, migratory, and geopolitical crises overlap. At the same time, societies age, become more heterogeneous, and more demanding regarding access to rights, protection, and recognition. In many cases, governments are no longer able to build consistent collective directions and, above all, end up managing pressures.
The restrictions of the contemporary State
In this context, it may be important to acknowledge a first structural constraint: the fiscal constraint. We hope that the reflections in the previous articles have made it clear that the real fiscal issue is not limited to the size of tax revenue, the tax burden, or the public deficit. The central problem involves the growing difficulty of organizing, prioritizing, and politically sustaining public revenues and expenditures that are minimally consistent with collective priorities in societies marked by fragmentation, multiplying demands, low coordination capacity, and enormous distributive resistance. To a large extent, the fiscal issue ends up functioning as a condensed expression of several of the problems discussed throughout this series.
In virtually all contemporary societies, pressures on spending tend to grow persistently. Population aging increases pension, health, and care expenses. Technological and productive transformations put pressure on educational systems and skills training policies. Extreme weather events require increasing investments in adaptation, infrastructure, and risk mitigation. At the same time, slower economic growth and high global competition reduce the scope for continued expansion of public revenues.
Thus, a structural tension arises between growing social expectations and sustained financing capacity. And this tension tends to worsen because contemporary democratic societies face enormous political difficulties in withdrawing benefits, reviewing acquired rights, or establishing explicit priorities. The expansion of demands occurs incrementally and continuously; while distributive adjustments produce immediate and concentrated political costs.
But perhaps even more important is the political constraint. Contemporary democracies operate in increasingly fragmented environments. Parties have lost their capacity for broad representation; unions, associations, and other traditional forms of social mediation have weakened; collective identities have become more fluid and segmented. At the same time, digital networks have enormously expanded the capacity for mobilization, pressure, and vocalization of specific interests. Governing has increasingly come to mean managing simultaneous pressures from multiple groups, often incapable of building minimally lasting consensus.
Governing in fragmented societies
In several countries—and Brazil offers eloquent examples of this dynamic—politics has also increasingly begun to operate according to a logic of permanent confrontation. The adversary ceases to be seen as a bearer of legitimate interests and comes to occupy the place of an enemy to be defeated. In this environment, negotiation, compromise, and the gradual building of consensus tend to be perceived less as a constitutive part of democracy and more as a sign of weakness, undue concession, or political betrayal. Often, it matters little whether a given proposal could produce broader collective benefits; the essential thing becomes preventing the "other side" from obtaining legitimacy, recognition, or the capacity to govern.
The very idea of collective interest becomes more difficult to sustain in societies marked by strong polarization, institutional distrust, and constant disputes over recognition and resources. In many cases, governments only manage to build unstable and temporary majorities, insufficient to support long-term reforms or politically costly decisions. The result is an environment in which politics frequently oscillates between decisional paralysis, emergency responses, and short-term measures aimed at the immediate management of crises.
There is also a less visible, but perhaps decisive, constraint: the growing difficulty of processing complexities. The modern state was organized from relatively compartmentalized structures: ministries, agencies, secretariats, and systems specialized in specific themes. But the major contemporary problems escape these traditional administrative boundaries. Climate change, artificial intelligence, food security, migration, pandemics, transnational organized crime, and energy transition are simultaneously economic, social, technological, environmental, and geopolitical problems.
These issues require coordination between different levels of government, collaboration between public and private institutions, integration of highly specialized technical knowledge, and the ability to respond relatively quickly. Often, the problem is no longer just a lack of resources, but difficulty in coordination, integration, and decision-making capacity in highly complex environments.
The problem of time
Added to this is a fourth constraint: time. Perhaps one of the simplest ways to summarize the mismatch discussed throughout this series is to recognize that society already operates according to digital dynamics, while the State continues to function, to a large extent, from analog paradigms. And it's not just about computerization or technological modernization. The central problem involves distinct temporalities. Financial markets operate in real time. Social networks function in cycles of minutes or hours. Technological innovation advances continuously. Climate crises accumulate long-term effects but demand immediate responses. Democratic political institutions, on the other hand, operate through negotiation, deliberation, consensus building, legislative procedures, administrative implementation, and institutional control—processes that are necessarily slower.
Part of the persistent feeling of crisis stems precisely from this growing incompatibility between the timeframe of social pressures and the time needed to produce legitimate and sustainable decisions. The contemporary state often seems to lag behind—not necessarily because its agents are incapable, but because the institutional structures were designed for a very different temporal reality.
What will need to be rebuilt?
Given this scenario, it may be illusory to imagine simple or definitive solutions. It does not seem possible to return to the model of state built throughout the 20th century, based on greater social homogeneity, accelerated growth, relatively stable national borders, and strong centralized coordination capacity. But it also does not seem plausible to imagine complex societies functioning without robust state capacities.
Therefore, the central question may no longer be simply about discussing "more" or "less" state. The decisive problem seems to be another: what capacities need to be rebuilt so that public institutions remain capable of organizing collective life in profoundly transformed societies?
It will likely be essential to regain the ability to prioritize. No state will be able to simultaneously respond to all demands, expectations, and pressures. Governing will once again require explicit choices—and the political strength to uphold them.
It will also be necessary to expand coordination capacity. Complex and interdependent problems can hardly be addressed by excessively fragmented structures, marked by permanent institutional competition and low decisional integration.
Equally important will be rebuilding legitimacy. Neither technology, nor artificial intelligence, nor the expansion of management tools can replace political authority, institutional trust, or the ability to build some degree of collective recognition regarding difficult decisions.
Finally, it may be necessary to recover the ability to think long-term—precisely one of the dimensions most weakened in societies organized by permanent urgency, hyperexposure, and the continuous pressure of the present.
Ultimately, perhaps the greatest challenge of the 21st century is not simply defining the ideal size of the state, but preserving institutions capable of sustaining some form of collective action in increasingly fragmented, accelerated societies pressured by simultaneous crises. The future of the state will depend less on its formal size and more on its capacity to organize collective choices in societies that have lost many of the references, mediations, and shared horizons that underpinned politics throughout the last century.
This text does not necessarily reflect the opinion of Unicamp.
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