The Industrial Revolution is often portrayed as an abrupt turning point in history, the result of technological and scientific advances that profoundly transformed economic and social structures. However, this view can obscure the complex historical trajectories that paved the way for such transformation—and confuse causes and effects. The book Civilization and Innovation: The Industrial Revolution as a Civilizational Evolutionary Phenomenon, by Ademar Ribeiro Romeiro (Editora Annablume, 2024), offers a thought-provoking and original reading by situating the Industrial Revolution as the outcome of a long evolutionary process, rooted in cultural, institutional and technological changes that developed over centuries in Western Europe.
Romeiro argues that the Industrial Revolution was not an isolated event, but rather the result of a peculiar civilizational trajectory, which promoted an unprecedented openness to the introduction of innovations. This trajectory began with the consolidation of the feudal system in the 11th century and extended until the beginning of the 19th century, a period in which significant transformations occurred in political orders, institutions and social practices.
The work highlights how the interaction between cultural, institutional, organizational and technological innovations created the conditions for an “explosion” of innovations that drove sustained economic growth, characteristic of the Industrial Revolution.
By adopting an evolutionary perspective, Romeiro contributes to the contemporary historiographical debate, challenging interpretations that attribute the emergence of modernity exclusively to technological or economic factors. Instead, he emphasizes the importance of understanding the civilizational transformations that shaped the capacity for innovation and adaptation of European societies.
This approach offers insights valuable for reflecting on contemporary dilemmas — especially with regard to sustainability, governance and the relationship between science, technology and society.
This broader view of innovation — which goes beyond the technical — allows us to highlight some aspects that are not always considered in conventional analyses. First, it is essential to recognize that innovation is not only technical, but also social and institutional. When treated as an exclusive product of laboratories and factories, the idea of innovation tends to neglect the fact that it only materializes when it finds fertile ground: institutions capable of absorbing it, markets prepared to demand it, and cultural values that legitimize it.
Technology, by itself, does not change the world — what transforms it is the rearrangement of norms, social practices and institutional structures.
Furthermore, innovation must be understood as a long-term process. It is not a one-off act, but a cumulative movement, resulting from a historical accumulation of experiences, learning, failures and reinterpretations. Its content is imbued with culture, power and conflict — and, therefore, can only be fully understood in the light of the long span of history.
Another key point is that disruption often feeds on continuity. Contrary to the view that sees innovation as an abrupt cut, the historical perspective shows that major transformations, such as the Industrial Revolution, were the result of trends that were already underway. The strengthening of modern science, the rationalization of production, the belief in progress and the advancement of market institutions did not emerge at a specific moment, but were gradually consolidated.
Finally, it is essential to highlight the role of the State and reforming elites. The emergence of the industrial economy was not spontaneous. It was the result of political decisions, strategic projects and institutional arrangements promoted by national States, reforming elites and rising social groups.
By proposing a broad and contextualized reading of innovation, Romeiro's book contributes to restoring this dimension, often obscured by narratives focused exclusively on the “entrepreneurial spirit” or individual genius.
The quality of Ademar Romeiro's work is not only due to the erudition with which it is written, but also to the long intellectual journey that sustains it. The result of decades of reflection, the book has its roots in the author's curiosity about history, which was awakened during his doctorate in France. It was during this period that, in long and fruitful conversations with his advisor — the Polish economist Ignacy Sachs, a brilliant figure and pioneer of eco-development and scientific environmentalism —, Romeiro began to draw the connections between economic development, institutional change and civilizational evolution.
The result is a solid work, which articulates original interpretations with an extensive and sophisticated bibliography — as highlighted during the book launch seminar, on May 9, by Professor Nelson Cantarino, from the Institute of Economics at Unicamp, who highlighted the rigor and theoretical density of the theses presented.
The use of the term “civilizational” to describe the Industrial Revolution forces us to move away from a reading limited to technology and economics and launches us into a discussion about the foundations of modernity.
An important caveat is in order here: although the term “civilization” is used in the book in an analytical and descriptive sense, without normative connotations, the reflection that I propose in this article intentionally starts from a normative reading — which understands civilization as a collective project guided by ethical and political values. In this sense, the Industrial Revolution was the consolidation of a world project — a new way of inhabiting time, space and social relations.
This project was based on a number of central elements. The first was the valorization of productive work, understood as the main route to social inclusion and the construction of wealth. The work ethic replaced aristocratic idleness, establishing factory discipline and meritocracy as the pillars of the new social order.
The second element was faith in progress and instrumental reason—the belief that technical-scientific knowledge would allow us to dominate nature and overcome the limits imposed on human existence. This rationality, although transformative, also carried within itself the seeds of alienation and environmental destruction.
A third pillar was the universalization of rights and citizenship, driven by the ideals of the French Revolution, which introduced the notion of inalienable rights for all human beings. Although this universalization was incomplete and marked by contradictions, it established the normative principle of legal and political equality as a civilizational horizon.
Finally, the idea of civilization as the overcoming of barbarism was consolidated — understood as rationalization, education and moralization, but also as colonization and cultural hierarchy. The narrative of civilizational superiority often justified domination over other peoples under the guise of progress.
What is most provocative about Professor Ademar's book, however, is that this reading of the past forces us to reflect on the present — and leads us to the fundamental question: what kind of civilization are we building with the innovations of the 21st century?
Today we are experiencing a new revolution — digital, biotechnological, algorithmic — whose impacts are already more profound than we can currently perceive. And what is worrying is that this contemporary innovation may have lost its civilizing content as we understood it until now.
Work, once the axis of citizenship, well-being and the financing of social security systems, is now increasingly threatened by automation. Millions face not only unemployment, but functional obsolescence — and with it, the loss of meaning. How can we sustain the social fabric without work as a symbolic and material reference?
Based on antidepressant pills, the growing use of legal and illegal drugs — from alcohol to cocaine, from anxiolytics to fentanyl? And how will the social security systems, structured on contributions linked to income from work, be financed? The erosion of work is also the erosion of a social pact that has not yet been replaced.
Technical reason, once a hope for emancipation, has also become a source of risk. Scientific knowledge and technology are no longer guarantees of progress — nor of solutions to the multiple crises facing humanity: from the climate emergency and environmental erosion to hunger and international migration flows. The paradox is clear.
On the one hand, science has never demonstrated its value so much — as in the response to the pandemic, in advances in artificial intelligence, vaccines and renewable energy — and yet, it has never been so contested by significant portions of society.
Denialism, obscurantism and conspiracy theories proliferate precisely when we depend most on technical knowledge to face global challenges.
On the other hand, there is a second layer to this paradox: even when we acknowledge science, it is not enough. The great crises of our time will not be resolved by technological innovations alone. They require new institutional arrangements, mechanisms for international cooperation, effective forms of financing and, above all, courageous political decisions. Technology is a necessary but not sufficient condition. Without a civilizing orientation, even the most sophisticated solutions can fail — or worsen the problems they aim to solve.
Citizenship, once a promise of universality, is being eroded by digital bubbles and segmentation algorithms. Rights are becoming fragmented, access to information is mediated by opaque interests, and politics is being captured by market and performance logic. The State, which in the past was the driving force behind civilizational innovation, now appears hesitant — or even captured.
In light of this, perhaps the most powerful lesson of the book is this: it is not enough to innovate. Innovation must be put back on the horizon of civilization. This implies repoliticizing the technological debate, redefining progress, and rebuilding the civilizing pact that gave meaning to modernity. But this repoliticization requires caution: when captured by obscurantist or sectarian interests, it can open new gaps for the contestation of science itself.
The impression is that we are living, today, not only a difficult transition, but a true regression in the civilizing process — not because of technological innovations per se, but because of the frustrations accumulated with the promises made over the last decades of economic growth and technological innovations.
Modernity promised us that knowledge, science, work and citizenship would lead us to a more just, freer and more egalitarian society. But what many see today — and not without reason — is the opposite: worsening inequalities, environmental and moral crises, fragile institutions and discredited elites. This frustration has given way to two corrosive vectors.
On the one hand, there is the rise of an authoritarian populism that denies the founding values of modernity—reason, science, tolerance, universal rights—and operates through resentment, fear, and rejection of plurality. On the other hand, a legitimate identity agenda is emerging, aimed at the inclusion of marginalized groups, but which, in some of its expressions, by emphasizing the particular, puts the principle of universal equality under strain. The result is a fraying of the common space, of dialogue, of mediated politics—of the collective project.
It is in this context that the book Civilization and Innovation becomes even more necessary. By reminding us that innovation can — and should — be part of a broader civilizational project, Romeiro helps us formulate an urgent question: How can we rebuild, update and defend the civilizing content of the social and technological transformations we are experiencing?
This is perhaps the most challenging intellectual and political task of our time.
This text does not necessarily reflect the opinion of Unicamp
Antonio Márcio Buainain He is a professor at the Institute of Economics at Unicamp and a researcher at the Center for Applied Economics, Agriculture and Environment (Cea/IE/Unicamp) and the National Institute of Science and Technology in Public Policies, Strategy and Development (INCT/PPED).
