The new global geopolitics is reorganizing many things, bringing signs about the future, like a box of surprises that, we hope, will not be like the one in the myth of Pandora.
Diplomacy, international trade and countries' strategic decisions are moving like tectonic plates, affecting all types of government and state policies. Added to this scenario is political, national and global polarization.
Science, technology and innovation (STI) policies are not left out, quite the contrary. With the production and appropriation of knowledge being one of the pillars of the international division of labor, there is a lot at stake. And this game starts with new rules, although not very clear. Better to follow them, before the game is played.
In this context, the 5th National STI Conference was held in Brasília. There were three days of presentations, with a diversity of points of view and a great convergence: no one doubts the importance of research and innovation as drivers of ongoing changes.
Some sessions of the Conference focused on the theme of industrial policy (that is, the New Industry Brazil – NIB[1], launched in January this year).
Reindustrialization, neoindustrialization and other terms have been used to highlight one of the tectonic movements that new geopolitics and new technologies have been causing: China is ceasing to be the world's factory, and cheap production based on cheap labor is giving way to intensification of the global competitive process, requiring the physical and strategic repositioning of industries.
The most frequent examples are the relocation of the semiconductor industry and the countries' massive investments in artificial intelligence. And there is much more in this context, such as energy transition, carbon neutral industry, bioeconomy, inclusion and distribution of the wealth produced, among others.
NIB has six main missions that, in the government's view, cover the main challenges and opportunities to promote the industry. It's hard to disagree with everything. Industry representations are involved in the NIB, and everyone wants it to be transformed into state policy. In other words, they want the policy not to be episodic, but long-lasting, as a strategic position that characterizes Brazil and in which economic and political agents can trust.
Several ministries, BNDES and other development banks, development agencies and industry representations are involved. The Presidency of the Republic too. Resources are important, although far from the volume of investments that will be necessary to attract to carry out the missions. There are 300 billion reais (a value close to 60 billion dollars at the current exchange rate), in addition to expected private, national and foreign investments.
Enthusiasm is great, at least that was what was heard from the presentations on the topic at the Fifth Conference.
After years without any industrial policy, Brazil places – in line with most countries, including the richest and most liberal past ones – this issue at the center of its development strategies.
The challenges to implementing the NIB and, even more so, making it successful and lasting as a state policy are gigantic. And the Conference discussions only touched on these challenges. Unfortunately.
Without this debate, we run the serious risk of, once again, falling into voluntarism, always seductive, and almost always impostor.
It is not enough to know how to design politics in its broader purposes, create programs and trumpet their importance. The festive phase is necessary, but largely insufficient. The authors should already know this, as there is no shortage of examples.
The recent history of Brazil's industrial policies, especially those involving STI, which means almost all of them, could help.
Of the latest industrial policies, the Industrial Technological and Foreign Trade Policy (PITCE, 2004-2008), the Productive Development Policy (PDP, 2008-2010) and the Plano Brasil Maior (PBM, 2011-2014), little is known beyond of the money allocated and the incentives offered. By the way, they also involved several ministries, banks and other actors in the productive and political systems.
They were all examined and debated for what they proposed, never for what they did or didn't do. Everything focused on design, nothing on implementation, nothing on results and much less on impacts. It is impossible to know if and to what extent they were successful, much less why.
When I say nothing, I mean nothing that has any consequences. Here and there, academics or researchers from some planning and evaluation body struggle to obtain data and study the results and the success or failure of these policies. These are important and illustrative cases, but with little or no influence on the course of things.
The last National Innovation Policy (PNI), which was also intended to be a state policy, was abandoned, without further explanation. Good or bad, it should be taken seriously and, independently of the government on duty, monitored, evaluated and fed back with what could be learned. It ended up being treated as government policy, by the one who left. And look, a monitoring and evaluation system was created involving 11 ministries, but no one paid any attention, and time passed like a movie replayed.
The most laborious and difficult part of a public policy is its implementation and conduct. This is precisely where you cannot be careless or lazy.
To be truly new and bring the intended economic and social benefits, it needs to create comprehensive and effective governance, including implementation, management, adjustments and accountability, all on a platform that allows consolidating data and actions and knowing what's going on.
Otherwise, we just have to wait for the next change of government to find out about the “newest” industrial policy (or lack thereof, which would be worse).
The NIB (or any other industrial policy) will never be a state policy based on decrees and enthusiastic speeches.
This text does not necessarily reflect the opinion of Unicamp.
[1] https://www.gov.br/mcom/pt-br/noticias/2024/janeiro/governo-federal-lanca-nova-industria-brasil
